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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
A CRITIQUE OF RECENT ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE
COURTS AND LEGISLATURE OF PENNSYLVANIA
By
ROBERT B. ELY, III*
Introduction
In examining the administrative law1 of Pennsylvania we shall need some
scale of values with which to compare our findings.
Let us take the viewpoint of one who has tried to reach impartial conclusions
in the light of the intensive discussion of the general subject, conducted during
the last decade by leading members of the bar, bench and government, as re-
ported in the leading bar association journals and law reviews. 2 The credo
of such a person would probably be roughly as follows:
Whether as boon or bane, administrative agencies are here to stay. They
were already in existence when the Colonies became States.8 They have since
*B.S., Princeton, 1928; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1931; Formerly Deputy Receiver
in Pennsylvania Department of Banking; Assistant Counsel, Insurance Company of North Am-
erica; Member Philadelphia and American Bar Associations.
1 This term is taken to include, as indicated in the Fifth Decennial Digest, page 630 "the
general principles of law governing the status, organization, powers and proceedings of .. .
administrative agencies, officers and agents, especially as affecting private persons and property,
and the judicial review and enforcement of the decisions of such agencies, officers and agents."
2 The intensity of the discussion is shown by the fact that since 1936 there have been ap-
proximately 125 leading articles and editorials published in the AaEaiCAN BA AssocIATION
JOURNAL alone.
As an indication of the eminence of the participants in this discussion, one finds the
following among the contributors to that Journal: An Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States (24 A.B.A.J. 282) ; Judges of 3 United States Circuit Courts of Appeals (26
A.B.A.J. 5, 130; 27 id. 71) ; The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey (24 A.B.A.J.
267; 34 id. 896) ; The Attorney General of the United States (27 A.B.A.J. 660); A former
Solicitor General of the United States (33 A.B.A.J. 434); Two Chairmen of the United States
Senate Committee on the Judiciary (32 A.B.A.J. 827; 34 id. 877; 35 id. 379); A Chairman of the
House Committee on the Judiciary (30 A.B.A.J. 3) ; The Chairman of two Federal Commissions (26
A.B.A.J. 342; 30 id 266); Three Presidents of the American Bar Association (24 A.B.A.J.
267, 29 id. 681; 31 id. 63; 32 id. 17).
3 For example, the Act of September 22, 1785, 2 Smith Laws 350, required the "supreme
executive Council of this commonwealth" to appoint "some proper and discreet person to be the mea-
surer of all kinds of corn and salt imported or brought into the port and city of Philadelphia for sale,"
and authorized the person thus appointed to -employ a sufficient number of able-bodied and
trusty persons to act as his deputies". Senator McCarran devotes to this fact the introduction
of his artide, A Needed Reform: A Special Admininrative Court, appearing in 35 A.B.A.J.
379.
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grown steadily in number, size and influence.4 There is no evidence of any trend
toward their wholesale abolition. 5
Like all human institutions, administrative agencies are neither better nor
worse than the persons who compose and use them.6 Their activities need not
amount to a "New Despotism", 7 nor will they produce a panacea for social
ills. The most that can be said is that in times of rapid social change there
arise governmental problems whose number and complexity require greater speed
and flexibility of action by more specialized experts than are available through
traditional judicial procedures.8 To solve these special problems it is proper
to relax slightly the rule of strict separation of the powers of government,
and to make use of bodies which have certain of the powers, and perform
certain of the functions, of both the legislature and the judiciary.
In assessing the value of the rules which make up the body of administrative
law in any jurisdiction, one may well be satisfied with a preliminary examination
"in gross". If one finds certain general principles clearly defined and well tstab-
lished in a given body of administrative law, and if the political history of the
people living under that law indicates no tendency toward unwholesome eccentricity
(whether radical or reactionary), then there is little need to be concerned over
the precise manner in which these principles have been implemented at any
given time. Specific statutes, decisions, rules and regulations can easily be supplied
or removed at the will of those who make and administer the law.
The general principles which form the sound core of a healthy body of ad-
ministrative law are these:-
4 THE PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL, Volume 88 (1947-48), prepared under the direction of the
Commonwealth's Secretary of the Department of Property and Supplies, devotes 139 pages of
fine type to listing the names of the officials and employees of the various departments, bureaus,
boards and commissions of the Commonwealth's Administrative Organization, with a chart of their
inter-relationships set out opposite page 1088.
5 Some 75 agencies and offices were abolished by section 2 of the Administrative Code of
1923 (June 7, P.L. 498) and its amendment of 1927 (April 13, P.L. 207); but this was merely
a clearing away of dead wood, so that the far greater number of remaining agencies and offices
might more efficiently perform the "executive and administrative work of this Commonwealth."
When the last Administrative Code of 1929 (April 9, P.L. 177) was enacted, seven more com-
missions were abolished; but, as indicated in note 9, below, those remaining far outnumbered
them. Since 1929 additions have been far in excess of removals.
6 See, for example, the discussion relative to the selection of the 350 Hearing Examiners to
function under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (33 A.B.A.J. 1, 213, 250, 421, 580,
688, 910; 34 id. 179, 420, 877, 896) and to the establishment of rules as to admissions to practice
before Federal Agencies (33 A.B.A.J. 307; 34 id., 877, 896). A very complete review is found in
the Civil Service Report of January 31, 1949, on Federal Hearing Examiners, published in the
Bulletin of the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association, Volume 1, Number 4.
7 The term used by the Lord Chief Justice of England as the title for his book on British ad-ministrative law, quoted by Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt as background for The Place of the
Mministrafive Tribunal in Our Legal System (24 A.B.A.J. 267). See also the quotation from
Keeton The Twilight of the, Common Law reprinted in Vol. CXXI TiHE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER
(Philadelphia) 182 (August 18, 1949).
8 As was said by Hon. Orie L. Phillips in The Courts and American Democracy (26 A.B.A.J.
130) "No doubt there are many fields where a body of impartial experts can better implement a
statute by rules and regulations than can [the legislature] and better find the facts that condition
the determination of an administrative controversy than can the courts ...."
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(1) "Separation of Powers" is still to be recognized as a basic principle
of the American form of government, and no greater departure should
be made from it than the exigencies of any given problem require. That
is to say:-
(2) The legislature should not delegate its authority to enact the basic rules
of socially acceptable conduct;
(3) The judiciary should not be relieved of its duty of interpreting and
applying these rules to facts found in individual cases.
(4) When performing the quasi-legislative function of promulgating rules
and regulations, administrative bodies should, as far as possible, observe
the rules for enacting a statute.
(5) When performing the quasi-judicial function of enforcing these rules
and regulations, administrative tribunals should, as far as possible, ob-
serve the rules for rendering a judgment at law or a decree in equity.
(6) To the extent that convntional legal and equitable remedies are not
adequate for the protection of affected parties against improper activities
of administrative agencies and officers, extraordinary remedies should
be made available for that purpose.
It goes without saying that the foregoing principles should be generally
understood and applied.
Pennsylvania Definition of These Principles
Let us, then, first ask how well these principles are defined and established
in the administrative law of Pennsylvania. The answer cannot be absolute, since
the principles, themselves, are and must be relative. When one attempts to render
more exact such of their phrases as "to the extent" and "as far as possible",
one leaves the field of legal discussion and enters that of political dispute.
The most that can be done in a paper of this nature is to give some indication
of the degree to which the lawmakers of the Commonwealth have recognized
and attempted to comply with these standards.
It would be tedious and virtually impossible to submit the whole, great
bulk" of Pennsylvania's administrative law to complete analysis. Moreover, as
0 Consider these statistics:-The three titles "State Government", "'Taxation and Fiscal Af-
fairs" and "Municipal and Quasi-Municipal Corporations" cover just over 1000 pages of PURDON'S
PENNSYLVANIA SrATUTES, 1936 Compact Edition, or nearly one-third of its total contents. This
percentage of legislative effort devoted to administrative law would seem to be about average for the
last century. In the 1943 biennial session of the General Assembly no less than 129 of the 373
laws enacted deal with points of "Administrative Law" as defined above; while in the two annual
sessions of 1842 and 1843 about 80 of the total of 303 laws approved by the Governor were
devoted to the same field.
So far as the courts are concerned, a review of the reports covering the years 1943-1949, in-
clusive, show the following numbers of decisions on points of administrative law: Supreme Court
203, Superior Court, 365, *asi Pruh cases appearing in the District & County Reports, 257.
To this total of 825 should be added a relatively insignificant number of instances in which
Pennsylvania rules were considered by the Federal Courts.
Turning to the work of the administrators, themselves, one finds that the PENNSYLVANIA
REGISTER, to be more fully discussed below, contains in its original edition and two supplements,
a total of about 1300 pages of effective administrative rules and regulations.
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has been said, it is unnecessary to do so. For these reasons we shall restrict
ourselves mainly to detailed discussion of only the leading general statutes on
the subject and of the decisions since 1943 of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
the court of last resort (even though, in view of the volume of its work in the
field, 10 the Superior Court is more nearly the "Court of Administrative Ap-
peals") 11
1-Separation of Power
Pennsylvania's Constitution shows clearly on its face that it is based on this
traditional principle of American government; 12 and the courts of the Common-
wealth have repeatedly declared this to be a fact.18 However, that Constitution
is equally clear in recognizing, both in general and specific terms, the propriety of
using administrative techniques where circumstances warrant.1 ' The courts, in
turn, have time and again upheld the propriety of creating agencies with quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial powers--interfering only when they were convinced
that the relaxation of basic principles had gone too far.16
2-Delegation of Authority
In accordance with the second principle mentioned above, it has been firmly
established that the General Assembly may not delegate to a board or agency
10 See figures in note 9, above.
11 This is particularly true in view of the fact that it is the court to which appeals must first be
taken in the following classes of cases, among others, forming a considerable portion of its
total work: Workman's Compensation (1915, June 2, P. L. 736, art. IV, section 427, and amend-
ments, 77 P.S. 901); Liquor Control Board (1933, Sp. Sess., Nov. 29, PL.. 15, art. IV, section 410,
and amendments, 77 P.S. 744-410; 1933, May 3, P.L. 252, section 13, and its amendments, 47
P.S. 96); Unemployment compensation (1936, Sp. Sess., Dec. 5, 1937, P.L. 2897, section 510 and
its amendments, 43 P.S. 751).
12 The legislative, executive and judicial powers of the Commonwealth are separately defined in
section 1 of Article II, section 1 of Article IV, and section 1 of Article V, respectively, of the
Constitution of 1873.
Is See, for example, the discussion in 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949), on the right of the
legislature to regulate salaries of court attaches.
14 E.g. Article XII refers to "'Public Officers" in the broadest terms; Article XIV deals
with County Officers; Article XV has to do with cities and their government; and Art. X re-
quires the General Assembly to "provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and
efficient system of public schools."
15 See authorities cited in notes 16 to 56, below. In this respect, the courts of Pennsylvania
have adopted the doctrine expressed in 16 CoRPus JuRus SECUNDUM, setcion 105 "Although the
absolute separation of the powers of government is the theory of American constitutional govern-
ment, it has never been entirely true in practice and is no longer an accepted canon among
political scientists. The courts recognize that the separation of the powers of government is far from
complete, and that the line of demarcation between them is often indefinite..."
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the privilege of substantive enactment. 16 However, the existence of this rule
has been held not to prohibit leaving to such boards and agencies the implementa-
tion of general policies which the legislature has declared with sufficient particu-
larity,'? nor creating agencies upon whose findings of fact decisions as to such
policies are to be made.18 With regard to the type of agency used, it has been
held that, except for a prohibition of certain special commissions,'6 there is wide
freedom of choice. For example, the agencies may be incorporated 20 or may take
the form of municipal authorities, 21 and interstate commissions22 as well as
16 In the following cases the Supreme Court has either held that the questions indicated are of
such substantive character that the General Assembly may not give to an administrative agency
absolute discretion to answer them, or, bearing in mind this rule against delegation of power,
has refused to hold that such discretion was intended to be given:-What restrictions may be
placed upon the common law right to discharge employees, 352 Pa. 586, 43 A.2d 894 (1945);
When refunds or credits for taxes are to be granted, 343 Pa. 573, 23 A.2d 737 (1942) ; What are
sufficient grounds for approval or disapproval of a contract between a public utility and an af-
filiate, 343 Pa. 109, 21 A.2d 920 (1941).; What is to be the amoun, of a tax, 334 Pa. 449, 7 A.2d
302 (1939) ; What are proper working hours. Note in this case an attempt was made to delegate
power to a Federal agency, 331 Pa. 255, 200 A. 672 (1938); What corporate securities must be
registered, 331 Pa. 193, 200 A. 864 (1938) ; What corporations may file joint tax returns, 328 Pa.
450, 197 A. 239 (1938) ; What shall be the rate of tax levied to meet agency requirements, 328
Pa. 225, 195 A. 90 (1937) ; What is to be the standard form of fire insurance contract, 166 Pa. 72,
30 A. 943 (1895); What public buildings are to be erected, and what care is to be given them.
Note the Act here was also violative of Article III, section 20 of the constitution, 156 Pa. 554, 27
A. 356 (1893).
As said in 343 Pa. 109, above, where an agency is given power to answer such questions, the
legislature must set out "definite standards, policies and limitations" to which the agency is re-
quired to adhere. Note- The legislature may not through an agency, accomplish a scheme of
control which it might not exercise directly, 356 Pa. 20, 51 A.2d 54 (1947).
17 E.g. The legislature may, if it defines with sufficient clarity the "primary standards", "basic
purposes", "guides of conduct", or "conditions": -Confer on an agency the right of eminent
domain, 359 Pa. 264, 59 A.2d 142 (1948); Delegate to redevelopment authorities the clearance
of blighted areas, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947); Give a board the right to fix prices of
milk and license dealers in it, 322 Pa. 257, 186 A. 336 (1936); Permit a board to make rules
governing the operation of mines, 310 Pa. 480, 165 A. 850 (1933), in which there is to be found
a very complete enumeration of valid legislative delegations upheld by the Superior Court; Make
approval of a board the condition precedent to annexation of territory by a school district, 305 Pa.
490, 158 A. 272 (1931); Give to a commissioner discretion in licensing bankers, 261 Pa. 129, 104
A. 505 (1918); Establish a board to censor motion pictures, 250 Pa. 225, 95 A. 433 (1915).
1 For example, it has been held proper:-
To permit an agency to make a survey to determine which mental health institutions are necessary
and fit for administration by the State, 341 Pa. 49, 17 A.2d 212 (1940) ;
To create "a commission to study and report on use of devices and methods of transmission
of information . . . in furtherance of gambling", 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d 612 (1938) ;
To give a commission power to "investigate . . . study and make recommendations . . . with
reference to the housing problem", 331 Pa. 209, 200 A. 834 (1938);
To permit county officers to decide whether, as a matter of fact, it would be desirable to take
advantage of privileges given by an Act of Assembly, 316 Pa. 65, 173 A. 289 (1934) ;
To permit a city official to estimate the amount of police protection required at public
entertainments and to charge a license fee based on this estimate, 312 Pa. 311, 167 A. 891 (1933).
19 Section 19 of Article Ill of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "The General As-
sembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power
to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects . . .
or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever."
20 Provided, of course, the corporation is not a private one; 325 Pa. 337, 190 A. 140 (1937).
21 Such as for the operation of city sewer and water properties, 332 Pa. 265, 2 A.2d 834 (1938).
22 362 Pa. 475, 65 A.2d-(1949).
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traditional departments, bureaus, boards, commissions and authorities.28 These
agencies remain, of course, subject to such scheme of control as their creator, the
legislature, may provide, as by an Administrative Code;24 and, if desired, the
duty of supervising them may be entrusted to courts inferior to the Supreme
Court.25 Similarly, subject to reasonable limitations imposed by the Constitution
upon methods of removal2 6 and pay,27 the legislature has a broad degree of
discretion with regard to the tenure28 and compensation of administrative officers,
as well as to the transfer of duties from one to another.29 Finally, the variety of
tasks which may be given administrative personnel is quite wide. Subject in every
case to the requirement that the rules of "due process" must be observed in
the performance of any program, 0 the legislature may assign to agencies of its
creation police powers previously exercised by municipalities,31 delegate general
23 See those enumerated in part in the Administrative Code of 1929, April 9, P.L. 177, 71 P.S.
51 et seq., and more fully in the Pennsylvania Manual, note 4, above.
24 Of which the constitutionality was upheld in 279 Pa. 234, 123 A. 792 (1924).
26 As by requiring the common pleas court to appoint an advisory board to inspect hospitals,
289 Pa. 437, 137 A. 635 (1927); or a school board, 236 Pa. 327, 84 A. 902 (1912). However,
Article V, sec. 21, of the Constitution provides that "no duties shall be imposed by law upon the
Supreme Court or any of the judges thereof, except such as are judicial . . .-
26 254 Pa. 45, 98 A. 782 (1916). The legislature may not, under section 4 of Article VI, take
from a board with right to appoint the correlative right to remove. And see 225 Pa. 364, 74 A. 203
(1909). However, as said in 329 Pa. 390, 197 A. 334 (1938), this section of the constitution
does not prevent "the abolition of the office itself, or the removal of the incumbent as an incident
to a bona fide reorganization of a governmental agency," citing 327 Pa. 190, 193 A. 645 (1937), 377
Pa. 181, 193 A. 694 (1937), 176 Pa. 213, 35 A. 199 (1896), and 165 Pa. 284, 30 A. 835 (1894).
Compare 327 Pa, 148, 193 A. 628 (1937), where the attempted abolition was of the officers, rather
than of the office, and 128 Pa. 324, 18 A. 445 (1889), where abolition of an officer would have
in fact been accomplished by termination of his salary.
27 See section 13 of Article III of the Constitution, and, under it 266 Pa. 100, 109 A. 611 (1920),
238 Pa. 255, 6 A. 75 (1913), 225 Pa. 511, 74 A. 430 (1909). Compare 6 S. & R. 322 (1820),
where the constitutional provision was not present. The legislature may not delegate its duty under
Article XIV, section 5, to fix the salary of county officers, 350 Pa. 141, 38 A.2d 75 (1944).
26 See 360 Pa. 304, 62 A.2d 30 (1948); 359 Pa. 144, 58 A.2d 454 (1948); 348 Pa. 101,
34 A.2d 59 (1943); 151 Sup. 522, 30 A.2d 726, 347 Pa. 418, 32 A.2d 565, 320 U.S. 782, 88 LEd.
469, 64 S. Ct. 192 (1943).
29 See 351 Pa. 600, 42 A.2d 51 (1945); 346 Pa. 438, 31 A.2d 151 (1943); 50 Pa. 436 (1867).
80 The leading case on this subject is 271 Pa. 346, 113 A. 357 (1921), discussed more in detail
in note 42, below. For earlier phases of the litigation see 68 Pa. Sup. 561; 260 Pa. 289, 103 A. 744;
and 75 Pa. Sup. 290 For U.S. Supreme Court opinion see 253 U.S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527, 64 LEd,
908. Other typical judicial constructions are found in 289 Pa. 307, 137 A. 601 (1927) and 72
Pa. 82 (1872) to the effect that an officer may not compel liquidation of a corporation, or take
land, without due notice and hearing. Note, however, the statement in 336 Pa. 469, 9 A.2d 408
(1939) that "due process is not synonymous with judicial process;" and the legislature may,
within certain bounds, limit appeals to the courts, 336 Pa. 257. 9 A.2d 407 (1939). For further
discussion, see 353 Pa. 98, 44 A.2d 291 (1945); 152 Sup. 279, 32 A.2d 40, reversed in 349
Pa. 184, 36 A.2d 777 (1943) ; 347 Pa. 191, 32 A.2d 236 (1943), reversed in 322 U.S. 174, 88
LEd. 1209, 64 S. Ct. 94, 518, discussed in 91 U. OF PA. L. REv. 764.
81 250 Pa. 115, 95 396 (1915); 247 Pa. 232, 93 A. 327 (1915); and municipal acquisition
of utilities may be made subject to administrative approval, 247 Pa. 26, 92 A. 1082 (1915).
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powers of regulation in the public interest (including licensing and fixing of
prices),82 and give elected agencies power of taxation.83
From the foregoing one would conclude that Pennsylvania has reached a
middle ground fairly between slavish adherence to rigid, narrowly defined,
principles of government, on the one hand, and experimental anarchy on the
other.
3-Preservation of the Judicial Role
Although there has been active debate on the subject," it does not seem
to the writer that there is in Pennsylvania any untoward tendency on the part
of the legislature to oust the courts from their role as arbiters of questions of
law. Section 41 of the Administrative Agency Law of 194535 provides for an
appeal by any interested and aggrieved party to the nisi prius court38 from any
final administrative "order, decree, decision, determination or ruling ...affect-
ing personal or property rights, privileges, immunities or obligations".7 As
a further gesture of wise respect for the judiciary, it is provided in the next section
that the procedure on such appeals "shall be in accordance with the rules of
civil procedure promulgated . . . by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania".88
Finally, in section 45 of that law, 89 provision is made for further appeal to the
Superior or Supreme Court as in other cases.
it is to be noted that this law does not apply to agencies which do not have
statewide jurisdiction, 40 and not to all of those which do." However, it has
been held in a number of cases, decided both prior and subsequent to the passage
of the Administrative Agency Law, that even where the legislature has been
silent with regard to, or has barred, appeal from the administrative agency,' 2
the courts still retain jurisdiction to review by way of certiorari,' 8 upon which
they can and should decide all questions of law, sufficiency of evidence, and
32 For an excellent general discussion, see 322 Pa. 257, 186 A. 336 (1936); and on rate-
making, 268 Pa. 192, 110 A. 775 (1920).
83 329 Pa. 390, 197 A. 334 note 26, above. Compare 236 Pa. 327, 84 A. 902 (1912); and
358 Pa, 45, 55 A.2d 803 (1947) discussed in 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 568.
84 See Byse, Administrative Procedure Reform in Pennsylvania, 97 U. oe PA. L. REv. 22 (1948).
35 1945, June 4, P.L. 1388, as amended by 1947, July 7, P.L. 1367.
58 I.e. the court of common pleas of Dauphin County.
37 See definition of "Adjudication" in section 2(a) of the Administrative Agency Law, rupra.
38 Id. section 42. The rules themselves are to be found in 353 Pa. xxdi.
89 Cited in note 35, above.
40 See definition of "Agency" in Section 2(b).
41 Section 51 exempts proceedings involving settlement, resettlement, review or refund of taxes,
bonus, interest or payment into the State Treasury; agencies from which appeals are provided in
other statutes, adjudication of the Banking and Building and Loan Boards; and liquidation of
banks, building and loans and insurance companies.
42 One criticism of Pennsylvania's administrative law is that this has been done too often.
48 Cases on this point are so numerous that only the following are given as specimens: 357 Pa.
514, 55 A.2d 534 (1947); 355 Pa. 307, 49 A.2d 783 (1946); 355 Pa. 135, 49 A.2d 639 (1946);
352 Pa, 565, 43 A.2d 127 (1945); 341 Pa. 568, 20 A.2d 209 (1941).
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abuse of administrative discretion. 4 ' Moreover, even when in a rate-making
case 5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the General Assembly had combined
in an attempt to restrict the judicial role, the Supreme Court of the United States4"
made it dear that the legislature could not remove, noc could the courts sur-
render, the latter's proper role of deciding fundamental questions of law and
fact.
In short, there does not appear to be much likelihood that in Pennsylvania
the use of administrative techniques will be accompanied by undue diminution
of judicial power and prestige. Conditions in that Commonwealth belie Dean
Pound's statement 47 that "it is a significant sign of the times that the immunity
of public officials from the supremacy of the law is being urged along with
immunity of administrative agencies from judicial scrutiny of their acts."
However, on the other hand, one does not find the courts overzealous in
interfering with the agencies created by the legislature. For example, it has been
held that the courts should not:-interfere with the action of any agency in
making rules of the type authorized by the statute creating it;"" use their
equitable powers to impede the proper function of administrative procedure; 4"
permit the extraordinary writ of prohibition or other remedies to be substituted
for prescribed appeals through administrative channels;' 0 substitute their dis-
ution for that given to an administrative agency; 5 grant a right of appeal
until complainants have exhausted available administratie remedies;' 8 nor
4' See for example:-359 Pa. 461, 60 A.2d 37 (1948) ; 359 Pa. 536, 59 A.2d 927 (1948) ; 358 Pa.
636, 57 A.2d 862 (1948); 355 Pa. 307, 49 A.2d 783 (1946); 351 Pa. 475, 41 A.2d 670 (1945);
348 Pa. 267, 35 A.2d 290 (1944); 348 Pa. 266, 35 A.2d 291 (1944); 348 Pa. 263, 35 A.2d 289
(1944).
45 271 Pa. 346, 114 A. 369 (1921). Previous proceedings reported in 75 Pa. Sup. 290; 253
U.S. 287, 64 L.E. 908, 40 S. Ct. 527; 260 Pa. 289, 103 A. 744; 68 Pa. Sup. 561.
46 In 253 U.S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527, that Court said "The State must provide a fair opportunity
[to a utility company] for submitting that issue (of confiscation by fixing too low a rate] to a
judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts
Italics supplied.
4'7 Annual Survey of Law l-Further Analysis of Trends of judicial Decisions, 33 A.B.A.J. 1191
(1947).
48 Such as a rule placing the burden of proof on one of the parties in a hearing, 314 Pa.
207, 171 A. 690 (1934). See also 159 Sup. 94, 46 A.2d 598, reversed on other grounds in 356
Pa. 43, 50 A.2d 336 (1946) ; and 346 Pa. 103, 29 A.2d 34 (1942).
49 360 Pa. 29, 61 A.2d 133 (1948); 354 Pa. 570, 47 A.2d 713 (1946); 354 Pa. 472, 47 A.2d
810 (1946) 353 Pa. 563, 46 A.2d 233 (1946); 351 Pa. 129, 40 A.2d 392 (1944).
50 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948); 348 Pa. 595, 36 A.2d 321 (1944).
61 Cases on this point are legion. This is the ground most frequently stated in refusing man-
damus. Recent examples of the general proposition are:-362 Pa. 310, 65 A.2d-(1949) ; 362 Pa. 116,
65 A.2d-(1949); 361 Pa. 565, 64 A.2d 755 (1949); 361 Pa. 322, 64 A.2d 783 (1948); 357 Pa. 314.
55 A.2d 534 (1947); 356 Pa. 260, 51 A.2d 757 (1947); 355 Pa. 164, 49 A.2d 365 (1946);
354 Pa. 477, 47 A.2d 798 (1946); 354 Pa. 468, 47 A.2d 707 (1946).
52 335 Pa. 337, 6 A.2d 831 (1939); 314 Pa. 34, 170 A. 119 (1934); even where constitutional
questions are involved, 303 Pa. 469, 154 A. 799 (1931). Nor may an aggrieved party attack an
administrative order collaterally as an alternative to administrative appeal; 288 Pa. 359, 136 A. 239
(1927); 220 Pa. 435, 69 A. 900 (1908); 147 Pa. 481, 23 A. 769 (1892); 121 Pa. 118, 15 A. 473
(1888); 70 Pa. 221 (1871) 37 Pa. 371 (1860).
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entertain appeals. which are from an interlocutory administrative order's or not
properly pursued.54
These instances of judicial tolerance and cooperation could be considerably
multiplied"6 and supplemented with further cases proving that this tolerance
has not drifted into the vice of absolute Jaisser-faire."6 It would seem, therefore,
that Pennsylvania's legislature has left its judiciary ready and able to play their
role in the administrative field; and its judges have shown themselves properly
willing to do so.
4-Quasi-legislaiive Farnctions
Just as it is of crucial importance that the General Assembly shall not
transgress the bounds prescribed for it in the Constitution,57 and just as the
courts are occasionaly required to declare Acts of Assembly unconstitutional, so
must it be made certain that administrative bodies do not exceed the authority
which has been delegated to them, and so must the courts perform an analogous
task in this field as well. Pennsylvania's judiciary has discharged this duty with
firmness, but moderation. They have said that agency authority running con-
trary to common law is to be strictly construed; 68 that an agency may not tx-
ceed its statutory authority;5 9 and that administrative rules will be stricken
'down if they are oppressive, rather than properly regulatory.6 0 On the other
hand, it has been held that where the statute creating an agency is sufficiently
broadly worded, administrative authority will be extended by implication to cover
new conditions not in the contemplation of the legislature when the statute was
58 See 364 Pa. 167, 29 A.2d 483 (1943); 271 Pa. 39, 114 A. 642 (1921); 268 Pa. 235, 110
A. 467 (1920).
54 349 Pa. 450, 32 A.2d 714, (1944).
56 For example, it has been held on numerous occasions that, where an appeal from a taxing
agency takes the form of a trial de novo, introduction of the record supporting the agency's order
makes out a prima facie case for the validity of that order, 293 Pa. 186, 142 A. 134 (1928) ; 271 Pa.
225, 114 A. 774 (1921) ; 225 Pa. 272, 74 A. 65 (1909). Moreover, a board's deciison has repeatedly
been held to be entitled to "great weight" on appeal. Here, again authorities are so numerous
that only a few of the most recent are cited: 361 Pa. 231, 64 A.2d 769 (1949); 360 Pa. 638, 63
A+2d 349 (1948); 356 Pa. 577, 52 A.2d 568 (1947); 354 Pa. 266, 47 A.2d 251 (1946); 352 Pa.
311, 42 A.2d 558 (1945).
56 Since, for example, in tax cases the prima facie case made out by introduction of board records
is only this, and can be rebutted by proper evidence 250 Pa. 515, 95 A. 712 (1915) ; 236 Pa. 97,
84 A. 761 (1912); 229 Pa. 460, 79 A. 109 (1911). Moreover, even where the courts are limited
to review by way of certiorari only, they will, as discussed above, still consider and decide basic
questions of law.
67 See esptcially Articles II, III, X XI, X1I, XIII, XV, XVI, and XVII, as to matters of admin.
istrative law.
54 347 Pa. 130, 31 A.2d 537 (1943); 277 Pa. 472, 121 A. 488 (1923), later opinion in 280 Pa.
79, 124 A. 343 (1924).
59 For variations on this theme, see 362 Pa. 438, 65 A.2d-(1949); 361 Pa. 647, 65 A.2d (1949);
359 Pa. 357, 59 A.2d 301 (1948); 355 Pa. 637, 50 A.2d 684 (1947); 352 Pa. 504, 43 A.2d
229 (1945); 154 Sup. 419, 36 A.2d 185; 352 Pa. 204, 42 A.2d 596 (1945); 351 Pa. 146, 40 A.2d
489 (1945); 346 Pa. 555, 31 A.2d 530, certiorari denied 320 U.S. 757, 88 L.Ed. 451, 64 S. CL
64 (1943).
60 336 Pa. 310, 9 A.2d 621 (1939).
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enacted;$' and that th courts should not interfere with acts, orders, rules or
regulations within the precise terms or dear implications"2 of the statute creating
an agency.
A second essential of proper conduct by a legislature is that its enactments
be made after due hearing and with adequate publicity;63 and similar standards
should be imposed on administrative bodies in their quasi-legislative capacity. 6'
Unfortunately, this desideratum has been only partially accomplished in Penn-
sylvania. Prior to the enactment of the Administrative Agency Law," s there
was no general practice of having public hearings before adopting administrative
regulations;" and that law does not make such a practice mandatory.67 Similarly,
while that law originally required such regulations to be published before
becoming effective,68 and to be cumulatively indexed thereafter, 69 these require-
ments have been modified70 to the extent that administrative rules and regulations
need only be "printed and made available, upon written request, within thirty
days after ... adoption." Here are two fertile fields for reform.71
In short, it would seem that in Pennsylvania the treatment of quasi-legislative
activities is sound so far as concerns rules of what, by analogy to constitutionality
of legislation, may bt called "statutality" of administrative rules and regulations.
Perfection still lies ahead in the field of quasi-legislative administrative pro-
cedure.
5-Quasi-judicial Functions
Here we reach one of the most intensely discussed fields of administrative
activity. As we have said, the argument most often advanced for the use of
administrative tribunals, rather than courts, is the need for specialized experts
61 As by construing "moving pictures" to include "television," 360 Pa. 269, 62 A.2d 53 (1948).
This decision was nullified by the Act of May 2, 1949, No. 245.
62 361 Pa. 543, 64 A.2d 659 (1949); 359 Pa. 347, 59 A.2d 166 (1948); 354 Pa. 458, 47 A.2d
665 (1946), further litigated in 360 Pa. 129, 61 A.2d 343 (1948), and mentioned in 97 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 44, 272; 351 Pa. 139, 40 A.2d 404 (1945); 351 Pa. 108, 40 A.2d 399 (1944).
68 Otherwise the axiom "Ignorafio legis neminem excusat" is mockery.
64 See Greswald "Government in ignorance of the Law-A Plea for Better Publication of Executive
Legislation," 48 HA . L. REv. 204 (1934).
66, 1945, June 4, P.L. 1388.
66 Joint State Government Commission, Report to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania on Uniform Practice and Procedure before Departments, Boards and Commissions
of the Commonwealth (1943).
67 In spite of a recommendation by the Joint State Government Commission to this effect, op cit
supra note 66 at 16, 17.
68 1945, June 4, P.L. 1388, section 21.
69 The "Pennsylvania Register Act", 1945, June 4, P. L. 1392, Section 4.
70 By 1947, July 7, P.L. 1367.
11 See Byse, Administrative Procedure Reform in Pennsylvania, 97 U. Os' PA. L. Rv. 22 at 32
to 37, and the Report of the SectioN on Administrative Law, PA. BAR ASSN. Q. (June 1949).
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as judges, on the one hand, and for speed and flexibility on the other.T2 The
former argument has met with little denial; but it has properly and often been
said78 that in the quest for speed and flexibility there is a tendency to brush
aside the traditional requirements of a "fair trial".
Pennsylvania would seem to be approaching a sensible solution of this
delicate problem. In the "Adjudication Procedure" section of the Administrative
Agency Law 7 ' there is set out with equal clarity, and with greater brevity than
that of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act7 f and the model Uniform State
Administrative Law Bill,76 appropriate standards is to:-notice; hearings;
record; rules of evidence; examination and cross-*examination; briefs and argu-
ments; adjudications and service thereof and procedural regulations. The Penn-
sylvania Act is subject to some criticism for incompleteness 77 in failing to contain
the following provisions found in one or both of the Federal and Model
State Bills:-a prohibition against the same administrative official acting both
as investigator or prosecutor and as judge;7 8 a limitation on the type of sanction
which an agency may employ;7 9 a prohibition against the use at administrative
hearings of evidence not offered of record and made subject to cross-examination;' 0
a provision for intermediate reports or proposed decision;81 and authority for
declaratory orders. 2 The deficiencies may not be as serious as might, at first,
appear. It has not been argued that Pennsylvania administrators often play the
dual role of prosecutor-judge; the penalties which an agency may impose are
normally specified in the act creating it;83 thL courts have already supplied
the lack of detailed statutory rules as to administrative fair trials, including
72 Phillips, J., op. cit supra, note 8; President Roosevelt, in vetoing the Logan-Walter Bill
(27AmaRcAN BAR ASsOaA'rION JOURNAL 52, 1941), "Conventional processes of the court
are not adapted to handling controversies in the mass;" Hon. John J. Parker, Improving the Ad-
ministration of Justice, 27 idem 71 (1941); Bell, Let Me Pind the Facts, 26 idem 552 (1940),
"Defenders of the, process plead the necessity for expedited governmental machinery and claim
for it great advantages in expertness."
73 See, for example, the following articles in the AmaaxcA BAR AssoctA'oN JOURNAL:
volume 19, page 141 (1933) ; volume 20 page 612 (1934) ; volume 21, page 376 (1935) ; volume
23, pages 92. 95 (1936) ; volume 23, page 186 (1937) ; volume 24, pages 274, 279. 287 (a sym-
posium), 630 (Ross Essay), 897 (1938); volume 25, rages 453, 770, 883, 940 (selected Ross
Essay entries) (1939); volume 26, page 552, supra (1940); volume 27, beginning at pages
133 and 207 (a symposium) (1941) ; volume 29 pages 681, 702 (1943) ; volume 30, pages 3, 121
(1944) ;volume 32, pages 827, 863 (1946) ; volume 33, page 1191 (1947).
74 1945, June 4, P.L 1388-sections 31 to 35, inclusive.
75 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C.A., sections 1001-1011 (Supplement of 1946).
76 See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Model State Administrative
Procedure Act with Prefatory Note (1946).
77 See Byse, op. cit. supra note 71 at 26 and 27.
7 Compare Section 1004(c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 66.
79 Compare Section 1008 idem.
80 Compare Section 1006(c) idem.
81 Compare Section 1007 idem.
$2 Compare Section 1004(d) idem.
83 For example, in the case of the Insurance Commissioner, see 1921, May 17, P.L. 789, as
amended by 1931, June 22, P.L. 616, "The Insurance Commissioner may, in his discretion, pursue
any oae or more of the folowing course of action..." "
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handling of evidence;84 and there is no prohibition in the Administrative Agency
Law 5 against use of intermediate reports, proposed decisions or declaratory orders.
6-Appropriate Remedies for Administrative Abuses
We have already discussed above86 the Pennsylvania doctrines with regard
to the availability of the direct remedy of appeal by parties aggrieved by admin-
istrative action. It remains to consider briefly the related rules as to the avail-
ability of collateral and extraordinary remedies. They would appear to be ample.
There is both statutory and judicial authority for use of the courts' equitable
powers to enjoin a wrongful administrative act, 87 and for issuance of writs of
mandamus to compel performance of ministerial acts88 which have been wrong-
fully refused.80 Similarly, quo warranto can be employed by interested and
affected parties to question the title of admistrators to their office,90 and writs
of prohibition may, in proper circumstances, issue to restrain them.91
However, here as before, we find each such remedy hedged about by ap-
propriate restrictions. As we have seen, appeals will only be permitted after
exhaustion of administrative remedies.92 Moreover bills in equity cannot be
employed to restrain the execution of a spt.ifically authorized act, nor the
84 See 355 Pa. 521, 50 A.2d 301 (1947), in which the Supreme Court adopts the opinion of the
Superior Court, 158 Sup. 638, 46 A.2d 26 (1946) to the effect that "In hearings before the
[public utility] commission all parties must be apprised of the evidence submitted, and must be
given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to offer evidence in
explanation or rebuttal according to well understood rules. In no other way can a party maintain
its rights, or make a defense, or test the sufficiency of the facts to support the finding . . . and
while the commission is an administrative body, and even where it acts in [only] a quasi-judicial
capacity . . . the more imperative it is to preserve the essential rules of evidence . . ." Compare
with 359 Pa. 402, 59 A.2d 121 (1948) discussed in 97 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 77; and 157 Sup. 252,
42 A.2d 322; 353 Pa. 49, 44 A.2d 250 (1945). Note also discussion of "due process," supra.
86 1945, June 4, P.L. 1388.
T6 In section 3 hereof, pages 4 to 6, above.
87 See 559 Pa. 213, 58 A.2d 574 (1948); 340 Pa. 382, 17 A.2d 206 (1940); 331 Pa. 193,
200 A. 864 (1938); 276 Pa. 24, 119 A. 727 (1923); 249 Pa. 253, 94 A. 1091 (1915); 248 Pa.
559, 94 A. 248 (1915); 241 Pa. 146, 88 A. 426 (1913); 237 Pa. 616, 85 A. 879 (1912); 234
Pa. 481, 83 A. 362; 218 Pa. 100, 66 A. 1121 (1907)- 200 Pa. 629, 50 A. 198 (1901); 182
Pa. 251, 37 A. 853 (1897). For example of statutes, see 1913, July 26, P.L. 1374, Art. VI, sec. 31, as
to injunctions against the Public Utilities Commission, and 1933 May 15, P.L. 565, Art. VI,
sec. 605 as to injunctions against the Secretary of Banking.
88 Most recent are: 361 Pa. 607, 65 A.2d 402 (1949); 353 Pa. 142, 44 A.2d 575 (1945); 3553
Pa. 79, 44 A.2d 267 (1945); 347 Pa. 608, 32 A.2d 874 (1943) (discussing exclusive juris-
diction of the courts of Dauphin County) ; 343 Pa. 573, 25 A.2d 737 (1942).
89 Without such refusal, this extraordinary remedy will not be granted: 312 Pa. 67, 167 A. 779
(1933); I S. & R. 472 (1815).
90 A typical recent case upholding issuance of the writ is 359 Pa. 304, 59 A.2d 169 (1948).
As to its exclusion of other remedies, see 356 Pa. 573, 52 A.2d 653 (1947). The statutory authority
for its use is found in the Act of 1836, June 14. P.L. 621, and further decisions thereunder are
compiled in 12 PURDON'S STATUTES (ANNOTATED) 2021 to 2043. As to restrictions on its use by
private relators, see 355 Pa. 493, 50 A.2d 496.
91 For a recent and complete discussion of the use of the writ against "quasi-judicial tribunals",
see 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948) and cases therein cited. Compare with 360 Pa. 103, 61
A.2d 430 (1948), in which there is discussed the use of the writ against subordinate cwurts.
92 See note 52.
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exercise of properly conferred discretion.98 Similarly, it has been held that man-
damus will be refused where there is an adequate conventional remedy,"4 and that,
as we have said, a writ of prohibition cannot take the place of a conventional
appeal."r
Recognition of the Principles
It is not enough that one may be able, after considerable research, to find
adequate definitions of the foregoing principles among the Constitution, statutes
and decisions. If these principles are to have the necessary validity of working
rules, they must be generally recognized and understood by practicing lawyers
who use them as tools of their profession.
A fair index of thL degree to which the bar recognizes and uses a given body
of law is the kind and number of codes, digests, annotations and texts to be found
in the field concerned. Judged by this criterion, Pennsylvania, in common with
her sister States, is approaching but has not yet reached the dawn of an under-
standing of administrative law as a specialized field.
The Commonwealth has had a substantive Administrative Code for over
two decades; 9" but inspection of it shows that it contains only the barest frame-
work of the administrative machinery. The powers and duties of the various
departments and their subsidiaries are to be found in provisions scattered through-
out the sevenyt-seven titles of Purdon's Statutes. 97 On the procedural side, the Ad-
ministrative Agency Law98 is just over three years old and is not yet universal in its
application . 9
None of the principal Pennsylvania digests have as yet followed the recent
lead of the National Reporter system in devoting a special topic to "Administra-
tive Law". 00 One must still pick and hunt among such particular topics as "Work-
men's Compensation" or "Public Utilities" on the substantive side, and "Appeals"
or "Mandamus" on the procedural. 10 '
Annotations are on a corresponding level. "Purdon's Statutes (Annotated) "102
probably contain all the available decisions on relevant acts, but its arrangement
08 360 Pa. 29, 61 A.2d 133 (1948); 341 Pa. 568, 20 A.2d 209 (1941); 301 Pa. 358, 150 A. 102
(1930); 282 Pa. 387, 127 A. 836 (1925); 175 Pa. 512. 34 A. 916 (1896); 164 Pa. 477. 30 A. 383
(1894); 158 Pa. 272, 27 A. 945 (1893). See also, note 51.
94 239 Pa. 468, 86 A. 1019 (1913).
95 See note 91.
98 1923, June 7, P.L. 498, extensively revised in 1929, April 9. P. L. 177.
97 For example, provisions relative to the Department of Welfare are to be found in Titles 10
(Charities and Welfare), 61 (Penal and Correctional Institutions) and 62 (Poor Districts).
98 1945, P.L. 1388, sxpra.
9) Note particularly the exemption contained in section 51, and see discussion thereon in Byse,
op cis. supra at 44. Also note evidence of a tendency to extend the laws piecemeal, as in the case
of the 1947 insurance laws discussed infra, note 121.
100 FIFTH DECENNIAL DIGEST, Volume 1, pages 639-956 (1948).
101 See similar comments as to Federal material by Hon. Justin Miller in A Judge Lookr at Judicial
Review of Admiuiotrative Detfeminationi, 26 AmNi cMA BAR ASSOCIATON JOURNAL 5 (1940).
102 Published by the West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota.
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has the same flaws as that of the statutes themselves. The material must still be
taken piecemeal from a wide range of special topics and then synthesized.
The same remarks are to be made as to textbooks. The catalogue of the
Philadelphia Bar Association (which is as complete as any in the State) lists but
two books on the general subject of Pennsylvania Administrative Law.'" The
selection of texts devoted to Pennsylvania law on the specialized topics we have
mentioned is not much greater.' 0 '
However, these conditions are easily understandable. Prior to the beginning
of the "New Deal" in Washington, administrative law was in a stage of tentative
development roughly analogous to that in which "trespass on the case", equity,
and admiralty found themselves in their early days. 10 5 As recently as twenty
years ago there were those in high authority' 08 and in great numbers who viewed
the whole development of administrative law as a vicious tendency, and even
today snarling cries of "Bureaucracy" are heard. 10 7 It has only been two years
since an intensive campaign by the American Bar Association' 08 produced the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act.' 09 It took an equally vigorous struggle
by the Pennsylvania Bar Association" 0 to achieve the Commonwealth's counter-
part of this law."'
Straws in the Wind
At the present time it is safe to say that administrative techniques have
fully proved their worth, and are no longer to be viewed as "alien intruders" 1 2
into our governmental procedures. As Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the Supreme
108 Schnader, ADMINISTRATIVE COnE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA (1927); Hanne.
stad, ditto (1935).
104 Catalogued under the heading of "Pennsylvania Law", one finds among the works less than
twenty years old, only the following: Rules and Regulations of the Bureau of Employment and
Unemployment Compensation (1942), of the Department of Agriculture (1928), of the Depart.
ment of Internal Affairs (1928), of the Department of Industry (1931), and the Department
nf Welfare (1934); Digests of the Liquor Control System (1937), the Milk Control Law (1938)
and the Anthracite and Bituminous Mining Laws (1939); Ade How PENNSYLVANIA IS GOVERNED
(1939); Segal PENNSYLVANIA BANKING AND BUILDING AND LOAN CODES, ANNOTATED (1939).
These were, of course, brought down to date in the PENNSYLVANIA REGISTER, previously discussed.
105 See coments of Vanderbilt, C. J., in Administrative Procedures Shall Rules before Agencies
be Uniform, 34 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL 896 (1948).
108 Including the Lord Chief Justice of England, whose book THE NEW DESPOTISM is quoted
at length by Chief Justice Vanderbilt in The Place of Adminisirative Tribunalr in Oat Legal
System, 24 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL 267 (1938).
107 See McCarran, Regulatory Government: Its 'Unwritten and irrational Constitution,' 34 AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL 1005 (1948).
108 For a history of this struggle, see the following articles and editorials appearing in the
REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION:- volume 68, page 249 (1943); volume 69, pages
149, 271, 438 (1944) ; volume 70, pages 127, 128, 270, 272 (1945) ; volume 71, page 213 (1946).
109 June 11, 1946, chapter 324, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C.A. 1001 et seq., and amendments.
110 See PA. BAR ASSN. REP. as follows: volume 44, page 134 (1938); volume 43, pages 344-419
(1939); volume 46, page 248 (1940); volume 48, page 239 (1942); volume 49, page 170
(1943); volume 52, pages 144, 179, 181 (1946); volume 53, page 145. Also see Report of the
Section on Administrative Law, 19 PA, BAR. ASSN. Q., 386 (1948).
111 1945, June 4, P.L. 1388, supra.
112 Vanderbilt, op. cit. supra, note 105.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Court of New Jersey has recently said,118 it is now recognized that "Administrative
law has been rightly called the outstanding legal development of the twentieth
century" and what is now needed is for it "to be fully absorbed into the body
of our legal institutions."
It is heartening to note that the Chief Justice is backed in his views by
such high authority in the Federal field as the Chairman of the United States
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, who addressed to the 1948 Annual Meeting
of the American Bar Association a strong plea for "Further Improvements in
(Federal) Agency Procedure". 114 It is equally encouraging to note the degree
to which Pennsylvania has most recently shown its awareness of this need for
orderly development and integration of sound principles of administrative law
in the State, as well as the Federal, field.
In 1945 Congress, by Public Law 15 of its 79th Session ,"1 placed before
every State in the Union one of the broadest and most fundamental questions of
administrative law, "What is adequate regulation?".' 16 It accompanied this
question with a most forceful stimulus to the discovery of a correct answer
when it further provided that, in the absence of such regulation, the Federal
Anti-Trust Laws should apply to the business of insurance.117
Pennsylvania's reply to this challenge is illustrative of the essentials to the
orderly and correct development of administrative law in any jurisdiction. Full
use was made of available time' s for study of the particular problem in Penn-
sylvania and of the responses made in other jurisdictions,I 19 as well as the so-called
Model Bills 2 0 prepared for nation-wide use by representatives of the affected
industry. Well in advance of the last available session of the General Assembly
a legislative drafting committee was formed, composed of reprtsentatives of
the public and of all segments of the industry in Pennsylvania. This committee,
after consultation with representatives of the Departments of Insurance and
1 ldem.
114 34 AMEIucAN BAR AssocIATIoN JOURNAL 877 (1948).
It5 Chapter 20, 1st Session, 59 Statutes 34; 15 U.S.C. Section 1011-1015.
I16 Since Section 2(b) of the Act speaks of the business being "regulated by state law," and it is
clear that these terms must be defined more fully. For a discussion of this point, see "Fourth and
Fifth Reports of Sub-Committee of Lawyers to the Committee on Laws of the National Board of Fire
Underwriters . . ." (1946) at pages 4-9.
117 Section 2(b) of P.I. 15, cited in note 115, above.
118 Section 3(b) idem, as amended by July 25, 1947, chapter 326, 61 Statutes 448, suspended
the operation of the Federal Anti-Trust Laws until June 30, 1948.
119 See Ely, State Regulation of Fire Insurance Rates, 95 U. o' PA. L. Rev. 59 (1946), State Rating
and Related Laws, 1947, INsuRANcE LAw TOURNAT, No. 297. page 867 (1947).
120 Discussed at length in The Case for the All Industry Bill, published by United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Company of Baltimore (1946). See also the series of four booklets Insurance as
Interstate Commerce published in 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1949 by the Insurance Section of the
American Bar Association.
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Justice, drafted a series of bills which covered all phases of the problem' 2' and
which dovetailed into existing legislation on the subject.122 As a result of this
preliminary effort, the bills passed both Houses without opposition. They are
at present headed for court interpretation.128
The two principal Acts in this program, the Fire and Casualty Insurance
Rating Laws,' 24 show clearly the merits of having already developed in the Com-
monwealth an adequate administrative philosophy. There was already in existence
a governmental department operating in the field in question.' 25 All that was
needed was to prescribe new standards of conduct to be enforced' 26 and to give
that department necessary authority to enforce them.'2 7 So far as protecting the
rights of parties affected, the pre-existence of the Administrative Agency Law
made it possible merely to incorporate its provisions by reference.128
Conclusions
Throughout its history, Pennsylvania has made full use of administrative,
as well as legislative and judicial, techniques of government. As a result, there
is in this Commonwealth a considerable body of well established "administrative
law". Its volume is greater than is generally realized. While there is debate as
to some of its peripheral developments, its main body seems sound and sensible.
The text ind digest material in the field is at present scanty and lacking in
organization.
For the future, one can predict that Pennsylvania Administrative Law will
increase in quantity and improve in quality.
121 1947, June 11, P.L. 551-regulating rates and cooperative activities in fire and marine
insurance; 1947, June 11, P.L. 538-providing similar regulation for casualty insurance; 1947,
June 5, P.L. 443, being a counterpart on the State level of the Federal Clayton Act; 1947, June
5, P.U 456-legalizing the payment of commissions to insurance broker sand agents. Cf. Federal
Robinson-Patrnan Act; 1947, June 5, P.L. 445-"The Insurance Unfair Practices Act", analogous
to the Federal Trade Commission Act; compare the subject matter of these acts with Section 3(a)
of Public Law 15, 79th Congress, cited supra note 105.
122 In addition to the "repealer" sections of the Acts cited in note 121, see 1947, June 5, P.L.
439 and 1947, June 10, P.L. 495, amending existing laws to bring them into conformity with the
new regulation.
128 There is presently pending before the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County an appeal
from the action of the Insurance Commissioner in failing to disapprove a deviation filed under
the fire insurance rating law.
124 1947, June 11, P.L. 551, and 1947, June 11, P.L. 538, above.
125 The Insurance Department, established by 1921, May 17, P.L. 789.
126 In 1947 P.L. 551 and 1947 P..L 358, that "Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly
discriminatory;" in 1947 P.L. 443 that acquisition of stock of one insurance company by another
shall not "substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly;" in 1947 P.L. 456 that com-
mission shall be "for, or an account of, the solicitation or negotiation of contracts for insurance;"
and in 1947 P.L. 445 that "methods, acts and practices in the insurance business shall not be unfair
or deceptive".
127 As by disapproval of rates, 1947 P.L. 515, section 5, and 1947 P.L. 538, section 5; or by
"cease and desist" orders, 1947 P.L. 445, section 1 (337.3) and 1947 P.L. 445, section 7.
128 See 1947 P.L. 551, section 16(c); 1947 P.L, 538, section 17(c); 1947 P.L 443, section 1
(337.3); 1947 P.L. 443, section 8.
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The complexity of political, economic and social life, which called it into be-
ing, shows no signs of disappearing. Hence, its continued growth is assured.
Increasing public and official interest in it, stimulated by contests such as the
present, should guarantee that this growth will be along proper lines.
